Against Fantology Again by Johansson, Ingvar
25© The Author(s) 2016
L. Zaibert (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Ontology, 
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-55278-5_3
The term “fantology” has not yet (August 2016) entered The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the world’s most up-to-date philosophical dic-
tionary. This being so, one has to ask: what is fantology? Barry Smith, 
who coined the term, starts his paper “Against Fantology” by introducing 
it with this paragraph:
A dark force haunts much of what is most admirable in the philosophy of 
the last one hundred years. It consists, briefly put, in the doctrine to the 
effect that one can arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain 
superficial (syntactic) features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by 
Frege and Russell. More specifically, fantology is a doctrine to the effect 
that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically 
in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of first-order 
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vidual. Hence “fantology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syn-
tactically different kinds of referring expressions—(F), (G), (R), etc., and 
(a), (b), (c), etc.—so reality must consist of exactly two correspondingly 
different kinds of entity: the general (properties, concepts) and the particu-
lar (things, objects), the relation between these two kinds of entity being 
revealed in the predicate–argument structure of atomic formulas in first-
order logic. (Smith 2005, 153)
His view is not meant as a criticism of first-order predicate logic with 
identity understood as a logic; it is only meant as a criticism of directly 
corresponding ontologies. His paper fell dead from both the press and the 
Web. My paper is a new attempt to put the notion of fantology on the 
philosophical agenda. It is done in the hope of making clear a danger that 
is intrinsic to philosophical-ontological work (N.B. not ontologies in the 
information sciences).
I will not summarize Smith’s paper. Instead, I will make two moves 
that hopefully will cast new light on the importance of its central notion. 
First, I will present fantology in the light of a more general and in itself 
ontologically neutral operation that I call a default ontologization of a 
language; also proposed in Johansson (2013). Then, in the second and 
third sections, I will discuss Willard van Orman Quine’s views, since he 
is the most outspoken fantologist in the second half of the twentieth 
century. I think his lasting high philosophical status explains much of 
today’s lingering fantology in analytic metaphysics. Smith only hints at 
Quine’s explicit proposal for a canonical notation when in passing he 
states:
Fantology sometimes takes the form of a thesis according to which the 
language of standard predicate logic can serve the formulation of the truths 
of natural science in a uniquely illuminating way (its syntax mirrors, after 
all, the very structures in reality which such truths represent). So Quine, 
with his doctrine according to which the ontological commitments of a 
theory become evident only when the theory has been regimented in fan-
tological fashion. (Smith 2005, 156)
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1  Default Ontologization
The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis says that a certain community’s natural lan-
guage either determines (strong version) or influences (weak version) how 
the members of that community think and perceive, and thereby also partly 
how they act. One of Whorf ’s classic presumed yet contested examples is 
that the Hopi Indians are anti-realists about time because their language 
lacks tensed words; instead of the words “past”, “present”, and “future” 
events they use “recalled”, “reported”, and “anticipated” events.
It is only the weak version that can be taken seriously. When Whorf 
became multilingual he did not become totally immersed in the new 
languages he learnt, and Hopis can learn English. Even if true, the weak 
Sapir–Whorf hypothesis only states that the default key to a community’s 
lived reality—its experienced ontology—is its primary language.
This hypothesis is about the semantics of natural languages. Smith, 
however, is concerned with the syntax of logical languages. On the one 
hand, we have to distinguish between default ontologizations of natural 
and logical languages, respectively; and, on the other, between default 
ontologizations of a semantics and a syntax, respectively. All default ontol-
ogizations look upon the language in question as if it were unchangeable, 
but, of course, all languages, natural as well as logical, are malleable.
All languages can be given at least one default ontologization, that is, 
the central terms are hypothetically taken pretty straightforwardly to rep-
resent (in a wide sense of the term) something in a reality outside of 
the linguistic speech-or-writing and listening-or-reading acts; I do not 
regard parenthesis symbols as central terms. A default ontologization 
does not in itself say anything about how the actual language users in 
question conceive of non-linguistic reality, since they may move from 
language to language-independent reality in a more roundabout way. 
But it might deliver a good point of departure when trying to find out. 
Ontologizations that allow even purely spatial relations between terms to 
be ontologized, I call non-default ontologizations.
A default ontologization of a logical language is mainly an ontolo-
gization of a syntax, since in a logical language semantic content is by 
 definition abstracted away or never put in. However, a default ontologi-
zation of a syntax can only give rise to a pure structure, since a syntax is 
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just a structure, but normally we want more from an ontology. Therefore, 
some abstract content must also be inserted into some of the non-logical 
symbols. This means that a logical language may allow for more than one 
default ontologization; a fact that will be exemplified in due course.
Also, it may be discussed whether a certain logical constant allows for 
an ontologization or not. Bertrand Russell and David Armstrong have 
argued that some constants do and some do not. Armstrong, for instance, 
thinks that the conjunction symbol allows for ontologization, but that 
the disjunction and the negation symbols do not (Armstrong 1978 II, 
chs. 14–15). If need be, one may call an ontologization of all central 
terms a primary default ontologization, and one where some of the con-
stants are put aside as not being possible to ontologize a secondary default 
ontologization.
Fantology can now be characterized by means of the following state-
ment: only a default ontologization of traditional first-order predicate logic 
can display what the world is like. It can be explicitly put forward, as by 
Quine, or merely be implicitly taken for granted, as Armstrong seem-
ingly does (Smith 2005, sect. 5). If fantologists cannot express their ini-
tial ontological thoughts in first-order logic, they dismiss them. Since, as 
pointed out above, a logical language can allow for more than one default 
ontologization, this does not mean that all fantologists agree in onto-
logical matters. But, in their hands, first-order predicate logic neverthe-
less functions as a norm that prohibits many ontological positions to be 
stated. (Default ontologizations of logics such as modal logic and Prior’s 
tense logic do not count as fantology.)
Since all logical languages can be given at least one default ontologi-
zation, so can Aristotelian subject–predicate logic. Also, of course, each 
default ontologization can in a second step be claimed either to express 
the true ontology or to hide it. And Russell has claimed that (in my 
terms) all default ontologizations of subject–predicate logic seriously hide 
the true ontology. I will use his claim to give some more contents to the 
abstract notions of fantology and default ontologization presented so far.
The fundamental sentence of subject–predicate logic is “S is P”, and 
Russell claims that if subject–predicate logic is regarded as the one and 
only logic, then its ontologization leads to the false position of monism. 
That is, to some kind of monism. Since nothing in “S is P” has semantic 
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content, no conclusions about whether “S” refers to something physical, 
something mental, or something else, can be drawn from the subject–
predicate logic alone. Russell, therefore, calls it “logical monism.”
I think Russell’s reasoning can be reconstructed as follows. All entities 
in the world are either directly or indirectly related to each other. Now, 
if between two entities in the world, a and b, there is a relation R, then 
the natural symbolization of it is, as in predicate logic, “Rab”. However, 
in order to turn this logical form into the form “S is P”, one has to write 
either “a is Rb” or “b is Ra”. In what follows, I will reason as if the second 
alternative always applies. Assume next that there is a relation between b 
and c (predicate logic: “Rbc”); it must then be given the form “c is Rb”. 
The conjunction “(c is Rb) & (b is Ra)” shows that c certainly is at least 
indirectly related to a, too; and if the copula relation is transitive, then c 
is directly related to a just as much as to b. The reasoning can be repeated 
with new entities d, e, f, etc. entering the scene. This means that if the 
copula relation is all-embracing, as it is if the subject–predicate logic is 
taken to be the only proper logic, then there must be something of which 
all the entities a, b, c, etc. can be regarded as being properties. Russell 
himself says:
Spinoza’s metaphysic is the best example of what may be called ‘logical 
monism’—the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single sub-
stance, none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone. The 
ultimate basis for this view is the belief that every proposition has a single 
subject and a single predicate, which leads us to the conclusion that rela-
tions and plurality must be illusory. (Russell 1974, 559–560)
In this quotation, only Spinoza is mentioned, but Russell is of the same 
opinion with respect to the monisms of Hegel and Bradley (Russell 1974, 
703; 1910). And, in the quotation below, he accuses Leibniz of inconsis-
tency when Leibniz puts forward his pluralist monadology, but nonethe-
less regards the subject–predicate logic as the only logic. Leibniz claims 
that each monad is one single completely self-enclosed substance that has 
no relations to other substances, only a number of properties inhering in 
itself. This view fits well the sentence “S is P”. But how can one express 
the view that there are many distinct monads?
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Whether any valid inferences are possible from language to non-linguistic 
facts is a question as to which I do not care to dogmatize; but certainly the 
inferences found in Leibniz and other a priori philosophers are not valid, 
since all are due to a defective logic. The subject–predicate logic, which all 
such philosophers in the past assumed, either ignores relations altogether, 
or produces fallacious arguments to prove that relations are unreal. Leibniz 
is guilty of a special inconsistency in combining the subject–predicate logic 
with pluralism, for the proposition “there are many monads” is not of the 
subject-predicate form. To be consistent, a philosopher who believes all 
propositions to be of this form should be a monist like Spinoza. (Russell 
1974, 575)
The Russell quotations above are from his History of Western Philosophy, 
which was written during World War II. But in The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism, written during World War I, he thought it possible to create 
a logical language that would depict the ontology of the world much 
better than either a natural language or the subject–predicate logic can. 
He sometimes called it a logically perfect language, but I think that the 
expression “ontologically perfect language” is more appropriate as soon as 
a vocabulary is added. He says:
In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would corre-
spond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the 
exceptions of such words as “or”, “not”, “if ”, “then”, which have a different 
function. In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no 
more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be 
expressed by a combination of words. … A language of that sort … is set 
forth in Principia Mathematica. … It is a language which has only syntax 
and no vocabulary whatsoever. … It aims at being that sort of language 
that, if you add a vocabulary, would be a logically perfect language. Actual 
languages are not logically perfect in this sense, and they cannot possibly 
be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life. (Russell 1986, 176)
Needless to say, Russell could not possibly start by believing (to quote 
Smith) “in the doctrine to the effect that one can arrive at a correct ontol-
ogy by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic) features of first- 
order predicate logic,” since he was among the creators of this logic. He 
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came to his ontological positions independently of first-order predicate 
logic, but when it had been created, he meant that others could arrive 
at parts of the true ontological structure of the world by looking at its 
syntax.
Smith is partly turning Russell upside-down, but without denying 
relations. He claims that the syntax of Russell’s predicate logic does not 
display the ontological structure of the world, but that the Aristotelian “S 
is P” comes closer to doing so. However, he does not ontologize “S is P” 
without further ado. He claims that Aristotle’s famous ontological square—
consisting of: substantial (natural kinds) universals and particulars, and 
accidental (qualities/properties) universals and particulars—should be 
complemented by the pair process universals and particulars (processes 
in his sense include actions, events, and occurrences) and turned into an 
ontological sextet (Smith 2005, sect. 19).
Both subject–predicate logic and first-order predicate logic can be 
given a default ontologization. If one thinks that default ontologizations 
of first-order predicate logic are seriously misleading, one may use Smith’s 
term and call them fantologies. And if one thinks that default ontologi-
zations of subject–predicate logic are so, then one may (to coin a term) 
call them SisP-ontologies or sispontologies. Russell can then be said to 
accuse Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley of being sispontologists, just as Smith 
accuses Armstrong of being a fantologist (Smith 2005, sect. 4).
Subject–predicate logic contains a copula, be it “is”, as in “S is P”, 
or “are”, as in “Some S are P” and “All S are P”; but first-order predi-
cate logic contains no copula at all. Look at “Fa”, “∃xFx”, and “∀xFx”. 
This makes Smith talk about “the vanishing [of the] copula” in fantology 
(Smith 2005, sect. 13). Traditionally, the copula of true subject–predicate 
sentences has been taken to represent an inherence relation in the world. If 
“S is P” is true, then what is represented by “P” (normally a property) is 
taken to inhere in what is represented by “S” (normally a kind, natural or 
artificial). No such explicit relation symbol can be found when formulas 
in first-order predicate logic are to be ontologized. The early Armstrong 
answers the question of what the relationship (in Fa) between the referent 
of “F”, which Armstrong takes to be a universal, and a referent of “a”, 
which he takes to be a (“thin”) particular, by saying:
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It is concluded, therefore, that although particularity and universality are 
inseparable aspects of all existence, they are neither reducible to each other 
nor are they related. Though distinct, their union is closer than relation. 
(Armstrong 1978, II, 3)
Since first-order logic contains no symbol for a relation that connects 
universality and particularity, there is nothing that can be ontologized 
into such a relation. One might use Armstrong’s last sentence to char-
acterize, conversely, the very symbol “Fa” itself, and say that though “F” 
and “a” are distinct, the union between them is in predicate logic closer 
than that of a relation.
But there is more to be noted in relation to the copula. It is not only a 
matter of something that represents an inherence relation; it is also a mat-
ter of what kinds of entities the relation can relate. In “S is P”, be S and P 
either universals or instances of universals, a property can be predicated 
both about another property (e.g., “scarlet is red”) and about a kind of 
substance (e.g., “tomatoes are red”). But in “Fa” and “∃xFx” it is taken for 
granted that “F” is a general term, “a” the name of a particular, and “x” a 
variable for particulars. That is, the predications in question are never of 
a kind-of-particular, but always of particulars-as-particulars.
Of course, one can in first-order predicate logic introduce a distinc-
tion between two sorts of monadic predicates, kind predicates (“S”) and 
property predicates (“P”). The counterpart of the subject–predicate logic’s 
sentence “S is P” would then be “Sa & Pa”, which contains both a kind 
ascription and a property ascription. But this move does not introduce 
anything like an inherence relation into predicate logic. A conjunction 
of two predications of the same particular-as-particular does not, in con-
tradistinction to the subject–predicate logic, contain the possibility of 
speaking about an inherence relation between a property and a kind-of- 
entity. It does not make it possible to predicate P of S. In order to do that, 
a second-order predicate logic would be needed. One in which “P(S)” is 
regarded as a well-formed formula.
Armstrong does not make any attempt to amend predicate logic by a 
distinction between kind-predicates and property-predicates. And since 
he believes in universals, he therefore is of the opinion that there are no 
“irreducibly substantival [substantial] universals” (Armstrong 1978, II, 
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62), only monadic property universals. Russell also wanted to get rid of 
the whole notion of substance and its concomitant kind-of-substance: 
“‘Substance’ when taken seriously, is a concept impossible to free from 
difficulties” (Russell 1974, 211). Quine substitutes classes for both prop-
erty universals and kind universals.
Within the philosophy of science, the anti-substantial view defended 
by Russell and Armstrong has a clear repercussion. It means that it is not 
only everyday languages that should not be allowed to be ontologized, the 
same also goes for all known scientific languages. As Smith points out, 
many typical sentences of science conform to the “S is P” form (Smith 
2005, sect. 8). Not even physics contains only mathematical formulas.
I would like to stress that today’s fundamental particle physics does 
not make claims only about property bearing particles-as-particulars, but 
also about kinds of particles. And these are placed within a minor taxo-
nomical framework. The so-called standard model divides particles into 
quarks, leptons, gauge bosons, and the Higgs boson; and the first three 
taxa are divided further into more fine-grained ones. For instance, “the 
genus” gauge boson subsumes “the species” gluon, photon, Z boson, and 
W boson; and W bosons have non-zero values of all the three fundamen-
tal properties mass, electric charge, and spin. It is even from a physical-
ist stance quite a radical move to claim, that these purported natural 
kinds should not be allowed to be ontologized, and not be allowed to be 
regarded as having properties inhering in them.
According to Smith, fantology also brings with it “a peculiar insensi-
tivity to time” (Smith 2005, sect. 15). I agree. As I said earlier, one rea-
son why Russell wanted to replace subject–predicate logic with predicate 
logic was that predicate logic already displays on the surface the possibil-
ity of irreducible relations. But he had a second ontological reason to 
favor first-order predicate logic, too. In some papers 1905–07 (e.g., “On 
Denoting” [Russell 1905]), he criticized Alexius Meinong’s view that 
there are not only existing entities but also subsisting ones; that is, that 
there are different ways of existence. Consequently, in its syntax,  first- order 
predicate logic already rules out the possibility of talking of tense as 
modes of being as, for instance, Roman Ingarden does. Everything that 
belongs to a domain of discourse to which predicate logic is applied, has 
to exist in the same way.
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In predicate logic, “existence” is a quantifier. This is in line with 
G.E. Moore’s view that “existence” is not a predicate; and so, when ontol-
ogized, with Kant’s view that existence is not a property. But for Russell 
there is more to say than this. The view that “existence”/existence is nei-
ther a predicate nor a property, does not preclude the view that there are 
different ways or modes of existence. It merely means that no such way is 
a property representable by a predicate.
For Russell, it is important, from the ontological point of view, that 
predicate logic contains exactly one existential quantifier. From a purely 
logical point of view, however, the existential quantifier “∃x” may well be 
allowed to take subscripts that represent different ways of existence; for 
example, “1∃x” (in mode 1 there is at least one x), “2∃x” (in mode 2 there 
is at least one x), and so on. However, everything that is claimed to exist 
by means of sentences expressed in traditional first-order predicate logic 
is claimed to exist in the same way.
Subject–predicate logic, in contrast, allows that “S is P” may be 
replaced by “S was P” or by “S will be P”. Since predicate logic contains 
no copula, it cannot do exactly this. Of course, its symbolism allows time 
indexing of both the “F” and the “a” of “Fa”, but that is quite another 
thing. It does not introduce ways of existence; it merely specifies where in 
uniform time the referents of “F” and the “a” are to be situated.
Let it be noted that there are a number of language-independent rea-
sons for adopting a four-dimensionalist (or eternalist) view of time, in 
which all times exist in parity. But it follows from what I have said, that 
any naturalist default ontologization of first-order predicate logic is bound 
to embrace four-dimensionalism. Presentists cannot be fantologists.
2  Quine’s Canonical Notation
First-order predicate logic does not in itself entail a distinction between 
synthetic and analytic sentences or a denial that there is such a distinc-
tion. Therefore, both Russell and Quine can be fantologists; both of them 
subscribe to a distinction between language and reality. Two quotations 
from Quine’s central work Word and Object will be my point of depar-
ture in this section. When reading them, it should be kept in mind that 
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Quine regards (i) the existential quantifier as being definable by the uni-
versal quantifier together with the negation symbol, and (ii) names as 
being replaceable by definite descriptions. Therefore, neither the existen-
tial quantifier nor names are mentioned as immediately belonging to his 
canonical notation:
Taking the canonical notation [first-order predicate logic with identity] 
thus austerely, … we have just these basic constructions: predication, uni-
versal quantification …, and the truth functions. … The ultimate compo-
nents are the variables and general terms, and these combine in predication 
to form the atomic open sentences. What thus confronts us as a scheme for 
systems of the world is that structure so well understood by present-day 
logicians, the logic of quantification or calculus of predicates.
Not that the idioms thus renounced are supposed to be unneeded in the 
marketplace or in the laboratory. … The doctrine is only that such a canon-
ical idiom can be abstracted and then adhered to in the statement of one’s 
scientific theory. The doctrine is that all traits of reality worthy of the name 
can be set down in an idiom of this austere form if in any idiom.
It is in spirit a philosophical doctrine of categories, except that it is pecu-
liarly relative in its import. Of itself it sets no limits to the vocabulary of 
unanalyzed general terms admissible to science. (Quine 1960, 228)
And here comes what has been made famous under the motto “to be is to 
be the value of a bound variable”:
In our canonical notation of quantification, then, we find the restoration 
of law and order. Insofar as we adhere to this notation, the objects we are 
to be understood to admit are precisely the objects which we reckon to the 
universe of values over which the bound variables of quantification are to 
be considered to range. … To paraphrase a sentence into the canonical 
notation of quantification is, first and foremost, to make its ontic content 
explicit, quantification being a device for talking in general of objects. 
(Quine 1960, 242)
A logical language may allow for more than one default ontologization, 
and first-order predicate logic does. The predicate symbols always repre-
sent something general or abstract, but opinions may differ about what 
should be regarded as general. For Russell and Armstrong, the predicate 
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symbols represent property universals, whereas for Quine they repre-
sent classes or sets (he uses the terms interchangeably). This difference, 
however, is mitigated by the fact that the late Quine regards classes as 
universals (somewhere in the 1950s, he stops being a nominalist). In a 
response to Armstrong he writes: “What Armstrong has not perceived 
is that I, like him, espouse rather a realism of universals” (Quine 1981, 
182). Armstrong and Quine have also in common the views that (i) they 
leave it for future empirical science to decide what universals there are, 
(ii) they regard four-dimensionalism as the correct philosophy of time, 
and (iii) they deny that there are any mental entities.
The late Quine is a reductionist in two ways, and a non-reductionist in 
one way. He regards all physical objects to be reducible to the objects pos-
tulated by basic physics, and he regards all universals and abstract objects 
to be reducible to classes. He claims, however, that it is impossible to 
reduce classes to physical objects. He defends a physicalism-with-classes 
ontology. I quote:
Let us not leave the latter topic quite yet: ontology, or the values available 
to variables. As seen, we can go far with physical objects [he allows even 
spatiotemporal points to be called physical objects]. They are not, however, 
known to suffice. Certainly, as just now argued, we do not need to add 
mental objects. But we do need to add abstract objects, if we are to accom-
modate science as currently constituted. Certain things we want to say in 
science may compel us to admit into the range of values of the variables of 
quantification not only physical objects but also classes and relations of 
them. (Quine 1966, 244)
The early Armstrong, as I said, claims that the union between property 
universals and particulars-as-particulars is closer than that of a relation; 
and that therefore there is no need to discuss any relation between them. 
Quine behaves analogously. At first sight, since the symbol “Fa” can be 
read “a is member of the class of Fs” or “a ∈ F”, it may seem as if he pos-
its a kind of ontological membership-relation to explain the connection 
between physical objects and classes. But things are more complicated:
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The further part of logic is set theory, which requires there to be classes 
among the values of its variables of quantification. The one sign needed in 
set theory, beyond those appropriate to elementary logic, is the connective 
‘∈’ of membership. (Quine 1966, 110)
Quine here divides logic into set theory and elementary logic (the canon-
ical language), which means that (a) he places the epsilon symbol outside 
of his canonical language, and (b) he regards it as being a connective. Both 
these things are important in relation to a pertinent question that I will 
soon raise.
On the surface, it looks as if a second-order logic is needed in order to 
make quantifications over classes possible; that is, abstract classes must 
be representable by a variable in order to be able to be bound by a quan-
tifier. But, if this first impression were true, the first-order logic of the 
canonical language would not allow classes to exist. Therefore, in order to 
have a consistent ontological position, Quine has to explain how classes 
can become represented by variables in first-order predicate logic. I will 
now put forward the foreshadowed question: where and how does Quine 
try to accomplish this feat? As far as I can see, he never makes any explicit 
attempt. Moreover, I will now argue, if he had made one, he could not 
possibly have succeeded.
As is clear from the philosophy of science, reductions of one kind of 
physical objects to other kinds of physical objects (e.g., molecules to sub-
atomic particles) are confronted with problems; and as is clear from the 
philosophy of mathematics, reductions of one kind of abstract objects to 
other kinds of abstract objects (e.g., numbers to classes) are confronted 
with problems. Both these kinds of reduction problems, let it be noted, 
Quine regards as being soluble (whereas I consider them insoluble). 
However, his problem with how to make classes representable by vari-
ables in first-order logic is of quite another kind—and magnitude.
He must be able to define a relationship between the physical objects 
represented by the variables in the canonical language and the abstract 
class objects. The problem is analogous to Plato’s problem of how to 
explain the relationship between the sensible things in the spatiotemporal 
world and the entities in his transcendent atemporal realm of ideas. Plato 
introduced a relation of participation, but Quine can only appeal to the 
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epsilon symbol and what it might represent. As I will point out next, this 
is not enough.
Quine regards classes as extensionally defined by their members; classes 
that have exactly the same members are identical. Therefore, classes that 
have physical objects as members cannot ultimately be defined without 
the epsilon symbol being used; they cannot be regarded as non-definable 
particulars and then quantified over. Nonetheless, as noticed, he explic-
itly regards “∈” both (a) as being outside of predicate logic, and (b) as 
being a logical connective, not a relation predicate. Position (a) means 
that the membership relation needed in order to define classes cannot 
be stated in the canonical notation. Position (b) means that even if, in 
some way or other, the epsilon symbol could be made a natural part of 
the canonical language, it is not allowed to be ontologized, since it is on 
a par with the logical constants that, for Quine, are non-ontologizable.
In the same way that Russell claims that Leibniz is wrong in thinking 
that his monadology needs no other logic than subject–predicate logic, I 
claim that Quine is wrong in thinking that his physicalism-with-classes 
ontology needs no other logic than first-order predicate logic. Just as 
Leibniz cannot explain how on his own premises he can say “there are 
monads”, Quine cannot explain how on his own premises he can say 
“there are classes”.
I find what has now been said reason enough, when doing ontol-
ogy, for not letting oneself to be bound by Quine’s canonical notation. 
Nonetheless, another reason will be presented in the next section.
Smith is against fantology primarily because it makes it impossible 
to claim that there is an inherence relation between properties (quali-
ties) and kinds (substances), and that there is a has-as-participant relation 
between processes and kinds. Claims that are central to his ontological 
sextet. In outline, I am on Smith’s side in this criticism, even though I may 
differ from him with respect to some details concerning the philosophy 
of time, but I will not delve into this. Instead, I will now say some words 
about fantology in relation to an issue that remains untouched by Smith, 
namely, the existence or non-existence of intentionality.
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3  Intentionality in the Canonical Notation
Since first-order predicate logic is extensional, fantology takes the whole 
realm of intentional phenomena and the referents of intensional propo-
sitions away from the ontological picture. Some kind of physicalism is 
declared to be the fundamental ontological truth:
One may accept the Brentano thesis [of the irreducibility of intentionality] 
either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the impor-
tance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baseless-
ness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My 
attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second. … Not that I would forswear 
daily use of intentional idioms, or maintain that they are practically dis-
pensable. But they call, I think, for bifurcation in canonical language. … If 
we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical 
scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct 
quotation and no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution 
and behavior of organisms. … If we are venturing to formulate the funda-
mental laws of a branch of science, however tentatively, this austere idiom 
is again likely to be the one that suits. But if our use of canonical notation 
is meant only to dissolve verbal perplexities or facilitate logical deductions, 
we are often well advised to tolerate the idioms of propositional attitude. 
(Quine 1960, 221)
In traditional post-medieval epistemology—to be contrasted with mod-
ern so-called meta-epistemology—something non-physical has always 
played a central role. Descartes ended his quest for certain knowledge in 
his presumed indubitable utterance “cogito ergo sum”, which represents 
something in consciousness. Hume, despite his general skepticism, found 
the existence of simple impressions indubitable, and they were mental 
in character. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century empiricism 
saw attempts to ground epistemology in entities that are supposed to be 
neither physical nor mental. Most famous are Mach’s sensations or ele-
ments (Mach 1959 [1886]), Russell’s neutral monism (which allows rela-
tions) (Russell 1961 [1921]), and Carnap’s elementary experiences (1969 
[1928]). These observations give rise to the following question: what does 
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the epistemology of the physicalist Quine look like? He cannot, on pain 
of inconsistency, introduce something non-physical apart from classes.
It should be noted, that in systematic philosophy there cannot pos-
sibly be a gulf between ontology and epistemology. If one claims that 
an ontology is true, one lays claim to have some knowledge; and if one 
makes epistemological claims, one presupposes the existence of at least 
one cognitive faculty. Quine has to say something about epistemology, 
and he does.
One Quine expert says: “Much of Quine’s work in epistemology is thus 
a more or less speculative discussion of how a child might acquire cogni-
tive language” (Hylton 2014, 4.1). And this means how from a third- 
person perspective cognitive language is acquired. In Quine’s physicalist 
“empiricism,” empirical evidence has nothing to do with consciousness 
or any ontologically neutral entities. Empirical evidence is made equiva-
lent to physical impacts on our physical sensory system. Below comes 
another quotation (Quine makes no distinction between “intensional” 
and “intentional” idioms):
All three of these idioms—‘perceives that’, ‘thinks that’, ‘It occurred to him 
that’—are idioms of so-called propositional attitude. … As they stand, the 
idioms of propositional attitude resist predicate logic. … Their underlying 
trait, which pervades mentalistic talk pretty generally, is that they are inten-
sional, whereas predicate logic is extensional. … Extensionality is much of 
the glory of predicate logic, and it is much of the glory of any science that 
can be grammatically embedded in predicate logic. I find extensionality 
necessary, indeed, though not sufficient, for my full understanding of a 
theory. (Quine 1995, 90–91)
Quine—rightly to my mind—rejects traditional rationalism and empiri-
cism and their quest for certainty, but he also—wrongly to my mind—
denies the mere existence of non-physical entities beside the abstract 
classes. Is such a denial really epistemologically possible? How does 
Quine manage to take conscious thinking and perceiving completely 
away from the epistemological picture? The explanation has been deliv-
ered by A.W. Moore, and I refer to him for the argumentation. Here is 
his conclusion:
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[T]he single most important feature of Quine’s entire philosophy [is]: that 
its real driving force is his naturalism. Everything else flows from that; every-
thing else must be understood in terms of that; everything else needs to 
accommodate that. (Moore 2012, 308)
Beneath both Quine’s peculiar form of “empiricism” and his non- 
nominalist physicalism, there is an epistemological naturalism that he 
thinks grounds both. It says that the natural sciences’ way of investigat-
ing and making sense of things is the one and only way. No place is given 
to complementary ways. If the quest for absolute certainty is taken away 
from Descartes, Hume, and the early Carnap, their views can be refor-
mulated as follows. Descartes: the seemingly most indubitable fact is that 
there is at least one mental substance. Hume: the seemingly most indu-
bitable fact is that there are simple impressions. Carnap: the seemingly 
most indubitable fact is that there are elementary experiences. According 
to Quine, the seemingly most indubitable fact is that the natural sciences 
have recourse to a method that increases our knowledge of the world.
In my opinion, one can be a fallibilist and dismiss the quest for cer-
tainty without, pace Quine, denying the mere existence of conscious phe-
nomena, whether they are then later best classified as states, as acts, as 
events, or as being of all three kinds. Within my fallibilist framework I 
trust the natural sciences, but I also look upon Descartes’s cogito ergo sum 
as containing quite a kernel of truth. It can be laid bare as follows. The 
term “cogito” subsumes both the expressions “I perceive” and “I think”. 
One can just as well say to oneself (a) “I perceive, therefore I am” as (b) “I 
think, therefore I am”. However, in order to make a truly good epistemo-
logical point one cannot, like Descartes, speak as if a conscious moment 
of perceiving/thinking shows that there is a mental property bearer, which, 
moreover, is an enduring entity. Both these features can be doubted, but 
the belief in conscious occurrences nonetheless be retained.
The two Cartesian self-reflective utterances above should be replaced 
by: (a′) “now I am perceiving, therefore there now exists a conscious occur-
rence”, and (b′) “now I am thinking, therefore there now exists a conscious 
occurrence”. Using the term “propositional attitude”, I claim that I know 
(c′): “now I am perceiving-something/thinking-about-something, there-
fore there now exists a conscious occurrence of a propositional attitude”. 
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In fact, I am more certain that I have conscious moments of propositional 
attitudes, than I am that there is a mind-independent world studied by 
physics. But I am pretty certain of both.
My view does not entail the existence of any momentary free- floating 
Cartesian substances. The occurrences spoken of may well be—and I 
think they are—phenomena that are for their existence dependent on 
a brain-and-body without being identical with such a substratum. Just 
as physicists can discuss what subatomic particles there are, believers in 
conscious occurrences can discuss both what the parts and the structure 
of such phenomena are like, and what kind of material conditions of 
existence they have. The fact that there are conscious occurrences of per-
ception and thinking does not imply that their content and structure are 
epistemologically transparent; my own conjecture about the structure of 
consciousness is presented in Johansson (2014).
The first Quine quotation in this section contains the statement “If 
we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canoni-
cal scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows … only the physical 
constitution and behavior of organisms.” The expression “the true and 
ultimate structure of reality” is of crucial importance. Implicitly, Quine 
here brings in the old distinction between appearances and reality, and 
says that his canonical language is only meant for the ontology of the 
latter. But this he cannot say without allowing two different ways of exis-
tence, one for appearances and one for reality. Furthermore, if this were 
allowed, he could no longer claim that all ontological claims have to be 
translatable into the canonical language. Surely, if appearances there are, 
they must exist in some way. Thus, quite independently of the inconsis-
tency noted in the last section, there is in Quine’s philosophy another 
inconsistency, too.
Quine’s fantological ontology is doubly incoherent.
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